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GOOGLING AWAY YOUR PRIVACY: PROTECTING ONLINE SEARCH INQUIRIES
FROM UNWARRANTED STATE INTRUSION

Imagine waking up to the sounds of police officers
furiously knocking at your door. Your recent delve into the
evolution of uranium enrichment has made you the subject of FBI
monitoring.

The Google search data you used and the results you

retrieved when doing your research have been subpoenaed by the
government and suddenly, inexplicably, you are under
investigation.
On a given day, Google processes over 91 million searches
based on search data entered by its users.1 Google maintains
query logs, which provide a detailed account of search terms and
their accompanying data results.2 Google also collects some
identifying information that a user’s browser makes available
whenever he or she visits the website.3 This log includes the
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user’s Internet Protocol address, browser type, the date and
time of the query, and one or more cookies that can be used to
uniquely identify the user’s browser.4

Considering the sheer

volume of searches Google runs per day and the growing utility
of search engines such as Google in today’s society, the
possibilities and implications of such information being misused
are alarming.
Part I of this Note provides a history of internet search
engine growth and a brief description of search engine
mechanics. Part I also discusses the roots of internet search
data subpoenas and the basis for the court’s decision in
Gonzales v. Google granting the government’s demand for Google’s
search records.
Part II of this Note argues that the data we provide to
internet search engines and the search histories that are
created as a result are protected from unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

Internet users retain a reasonable expectation of

privacy when using search engines that searches will remain free
of governmental intrusion absent a lawful warrant.

Similar to

email communications-which are stored at fixed locations before
reaching their destination and, as such, retain a justifiable
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expectation of privacy the search term data we provide to search
engines are also stored at fixed locations before search results
are created and, as such, should also be protected from
unreasonable search and seizure.
Part III of this Note argues that in addition to receiving
Fourth Amendment protection, search term data also meet the
definition of “content” protected by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).

Therefore requiring

internet service providers to disclose internet user search data
through discovery subpoenas violates the ECPA.
Part IV contends that with the exponential growth of
internet search engines and the growth that is expected to
continue in the near future, permitting government seizure of
search data without a proper warrant would likely lead to
further intrusions of privacy and a Fourth Amendment that
provides little or no protection when employing modern
technologies.
As a whole, this Note challenges the current interpretation
of the third-party doctrine as it applies to modern electronic
communications.

It argues that the search histories internet

users create as part of their every day business and activities
are protected from unreasonable intrusion by both the Fourth
Amendment and the ECPA. By failing to protect the privacy of
internet users when using search engines, we risk damaging
3
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consumer confidence in using this essential technology and we
undermine the integrity of federal law.

I. GONZALES V. GOOGLE: THE ROOTS OF SEARCH QUERY SUBPOENAS
In August 2005, Google was served with a government
subpoena demanding disclosure of two months worth of search
queries entered into its search engine and production of any and
all Uniform Resource Locators (“URLs”) in Google’s index that
could be found by a given search query.5

The purpose of the

subpoena was to aid the government’s position in a different
case, ACLU v. Gonzales.6
In ACLU v. Gonzales, the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) and several other plaintiffs filed an action against
the government upon the enactment of the Child Online Protection
Act (“COPA”).

COPA prohibits communicating by means of the

World Wide Web “for commercial purposes that is available to any
minor and that includes material that is harmful to minors.”7
The purpose of COPA is to protect children from potentially
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harmful online communications.

The statute defines material

that is harmful to minors to mean material that is either
obscene or material that:
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and
with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) depicts,
describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act
or sexual conduct, an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals
or post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors.8
The ACLU and other plaintiffs challenged COPA because of
First Amendment constitutional concerns.9

The district court in

ACLU v. Reno granted a preliminary injunction with respect to
enforcing COPA on the grounds that COPA is likely to be found
unconstitutional on its face for violating the First Amendment
rights of adults.10

After granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme

Court affirmed the preliminary injunction and held that there
was insufficient information that alternative methods of
preventing minors from viewing harmful materials were any less
effective than COPA.11

In order to “allow the parties to update
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and supplement the factual record to reflect current
technological realities” the Court remanded the case for trial
on the merits and the preliminary stages for Gonzales v Google
were set.12
Following remand, the government initiated a study aimed at
testing the effectiveness of alternative methods of blocking
harmful online content from minors.13 The study was focused on
testing blocking and filtering software, which the government
contended was less effective for the proposed objective of
protecting children online than was COPA.14

To provide data for

its study, the government served a subpoena on Google, America
Online (“AOL”), Yahoo!, and Microsoft. The subpoena required a
listing of URLs available to each company’s users and the text
of user search queries.15 AOL, Microsoft, and Yahoo all produced
the subpoenaed materials, but Google objected.16
Google purportedly treats the information it receives as
part of search queries, as well as the method of searching its
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index and returning URLs, as highly confidential.17

Google

objected to the government’s initial request for the
information, stating that the apparent irrelevance of the data
sought for the government’s claims, the potential for
compromising Google’s trade secrets, and the impact on Google
user privacy made the requests unreasonable.18

The government

then moved to compel Google’s compliance.
The initial subpoena to Google sought the production of an
electronic file of all available URLs to be located on a query
on the company’s search engine.19 Following negotiations with
Google, the government narrowed its request to all queries
entered on a Google search engine during a one-week period.20
Finally, throughout the course of the action, the government
further restricted the scope of its request such that it
required only 5,000 entries from Google’s query log.21

Despite

the modifications to the government’s request, Google maintained
its objection and proceeded with the action.
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The U.S. District Court acknowledged that Google v.
Gonzales raised vital issues regarding the government’s power to
subpoena a third party, a third party’s interest in not being
forced to reveal confidential business information, and the
interest of individuals to be free from government surveillance
of their internet use.22
The court found that the government did not demonstrate a
substantial need for both the information contained in the
sample of URLs and sample of search query text.23

However,

because of the broad definition of “relevance” in Federal Rule
26 and the narrow scope of the subpoena, the court ordered
Google to confer with the government to develop a protocol for
the random selection and immediate production of 50,000 URLs.24
The court did not express an opinion on the privacy issue
because the government’s motion was only partially granted such
that only a sample of URLs were required for production and not
an entire log of search queries.25

As to the government’s motion

seeking an order requiring Google to disclose its users’ search
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queries, the motion was denied.26 The court also refrained from
expressing an opinion on the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (“ECPA”).27
By refraining to provide direction as to how the ECPA
should be interpreted with regard to search engine logs, the
Court has left an unclear and potentially dangerous area of
communications virtually unguarded.
states:

As Professor Henderson

“Without external restraint, technology will lead to an

expectation of no privacy and police practice will incorporate
that technology to a reality of no privacy.”28

This risk to

privacy is compounded by the growing use and necessity of
internet search engines.

Although the Court in Gonzales v.

Google chose not to rule on the privacy issue, its attempt at
judicial restraint has left a potential for further privacy
intrusions when using internet search engines such as Google.
A. THE HISTORY AND GROWTH OF INTERNET SEARCH ENGINES
In 1990, a group of McGill University of Montreal students
created what is considered the first internet search tool,
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“Archie.”

29

Archie was a script-based data gathering program,

which downloaded the directory listings of all the files located
on FTP sites and created a searchable database of filenames.30
In 1991, a group of researchers at the University of Minnesota
released a document search and retrieval network protocol called
“Gopher.”31

Gopher was followed by programs such as “Veronica”

and “Jughead,” which searched the files sorted in the Gopher
indexing system and provided an index of menu titles and
listings on thousands of Gopher servers.32
Once the World Wide Web became publicly available in August
1991, access to the internet increased exponentially and
internet search tool development expanded outside the realm of
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academia and industrial research.33

In 1993, “Mosaic” emerged as

the first web browser providing a graphical user interface and
along with it came “Wandex,” the first internet search engine.
Wandex was merely an index that captured URLs and was based on
an MIT-created web crawler designed to track web growth.34
However, the first search engine that allowed users to search
for any word in any web page with a simple user interface was
“WebCrawler,” born in 1994.35

Another research project, also in

1994, resulted in the creation of “Lycos,” which was the first
search engine to determine context and relevancy when linking to
websites instead of simple word matching.36

Lycos also provided

users with prefix matching, word proximity, and portions of web
pages.
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size of its document catalog, which reached 1.5 million
documents by 1995.

Other search engines also surfaced in 1995,

such as “Infoseek,” “AltaVista,” and “Excite.”37
AltaVista emerged as the leader in search engine technology
by late 1995 through its marketing techniques and high-speed
search capabilities.38

It was the first multi-lingual search

engine and the first to use advanced techniques such as phrase
searching.

AltaVista, Excite, and other “full-text” search

engines were in competition with “Yahoo!,” which debuted in 1994
and used a search technology that provided hierarchical,
subject-classified directories of web information.39

Between

1995 and 2000, several other search engines made their market
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debut, while others were acquired or disappeared from the
market.40
In 1998, “Google” was launched by Larry Page and Sergey
Brin.41

Google featured a simple user-interface and a search

technology that linked popularity and a method for objectively
ranking web pages based on human interest to produce effective
search results.42

By 2001, Google had grown to one of the most

popular and prominent search engines.43

Advances in search-

engine technology are increasing efficiency by allowing greater
data indexing without increased web crawling.44

“Geocoding” is

another recent innovation in search technology; geocoding
matches search results to geographic locations such as street
addresses, neighborhoods, and cities.45
Along with the advancement in search technology has come a
dramatic increase in the index size of search engines.

40

By the

Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and

Looking Ahead, 9 Yale J.L. & Tech. 124, <3> (2006).
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Wikipedia GeoCoding, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geocoding

(last visited Jan. 6, 2007).
13

120
end of 1999 major search engines could index up to 200 million
documents.46

However, by June 2000, Google was capable of

indexing 500 million web pages.47

By early 2004, MSN Search had

indexed 5 billion documents, and in late 2004, Google increased
its index database to 8 billion documents.48

In 2005, Yahoo!

Search had an index database of 20 billion items which included
web documents, images, and video.49

The trend of growth is

expected to continue as new content is formatted for internet
use and larger amounts of information are digitized for purposes
of online search.
B. The Searching Process and Communicating with Search Engines
As web crawling technology has developed over the last ten
years, so has the efficiency of search engines.

Today, Google

is capable of searching billions of web pages within seconds and
efficiently creating a list of websites that fit search data a
user provides.50 The process begins when a user enters a search
engine website such as Google and enters words or a phrase in
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the search engine’s search bar.51

The search engine then employs

special software called “spiders” to search the enormous amount
of data available on the Web.52

The spiders begin by searching

heavily used servers and popular pages based on user visits.53
The spider then indexes the words on those pages to match the
search criteria the user has provided and quickly spreads across
the most widely accessed parts of the Web.54

What separates

search engines is how quickly and efficiently their spiders
work.

The initial success of Google, for example, could be

attributed in large part to their innovative use of spiders.55
The initial Google system used multiple spiders, up to four at
one time, which were capable of crawling over 100 pages per
second.56

When the Google spiders were at work using the user-

provided search terms, the spiders searched for words within
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each HTML page and where the words were found.57 The Google
spider would then index every significant word on a page and
would leave out irrelevant articles such as “a” and “the.”58
Different approaches to searching are what allow spiders to work
more efficiently and gather more accurate data.59 Search engines
besides Google employ different types of search technology, such
as indexing the 100 most frequently used words on a page or the
first 20 lines of text on a page and often create a different
set of search results when using similar search data as Google.60
Moreover, the web page owners over which spiders do their
web crawling also impact what results are returned during
internet searches.61

By employing “meta tags,” website owners

specify key words that control how and when their web pages will
be indexed.

Meta tags provide guidance to the search engine

when choosing words with multiple meanings.62

In some respect,

the web page owner is communicating with the search engine and
providing its data to the user via search engine. By making its
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web page available for indexing by the search engine, through
its meta tag, the web page owner and internet users are
essentially communicating.

The web page owner can employ

technologies that communicate to the search engine to leave its
web page alone, to not index the words on its page nor to follow
its links.63
The future of search engine technology involves the growth
and greater efficiency of concept based searching, natural
language queries, and literal searches.64

However, while the

growth of search engines has benefited in large part to the
novelty and lack of regulation of the technology, there is no
doubt that its continued growth is dependent, at least in some
form, on free and private communications between internet users
and webpage owners.
II. The Fourth Amendment and a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.”

This fundamental liberty is rooted in the common law

and its significance has been recognized by American courts
63
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since the 1760s.65

Essentially, the chief objective of the

Fourth Amendment is to protect the privacy of citizens by
limiting the ability of police to see, hear, or invade the
spaces people deem private.66

However, the first issue in any

Fourth Amendment analysis is whether the government activity
constitutes a search and, if so, whether the search is
unreasonable.67

Certain activities (e.g., observing things in

public) are not classified as “searches” and are given no Fourth
Amendment protection.68

As interpreted by the United States

Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment does not restrict the search
and seizure of information provided to third parties.69 The
Fourth Amendment only prohibits search and seizures that are
considered unreasonable. That is, the Fourth Amendment is only
applicable where the government invades a reasonable expectation
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of privacy.70

However, as the Supreme Court has dictated, we

retain no reasonable expectation of privacy on information we
knowingly make available to the public. Determining if and when
we have knowingly provided information to the public and
consequently forfeited our right to privacy has been the subject
of considerable debate.
A. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted a
“trespass-based” interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. That
is, where government did not encroach on the defendant’s
property in order to obtain evidence, there was no search and
consequently no unlawful seizure of evidence.71

In Olmstead,

federal agents tapped the lines running from the residences of
the defendants into their main offices where their illegal
activities were taking place.72

The taps were made in the

streets and below the homes of the defendants, thus the court
held that the defendants had no property interests in the
property being tapped.73

This property-based interpretation of

70
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search and seizure law was overturned in 1966 with the Court’s
decision in Katz v. United States.74
In Katz, law enforcement agents placed a “bug” outside a
public telephone booth and thus the Court had to decide whether
electronically listening to and recording words violated the
privacy on which the defendant reasonably relied upon when using
the telephone booth.75

The Court articulated a two-part test to

determine where government conduct constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search: “There is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”76

Therefore, under the

court’s two-fold requirement, a person in a telephone booth was
entitled to rely upon the Fourth Amendment’s protection in
assuming his conversation would not be captured and broadcast
without his consent.77
Moreover, in United States v. Kennedy the court held in
line with Katz, that the defendant’s constitutional rights had
not been violated when his user information was divulged by his

74
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internet service provider via a faulty warrant.78 In so holding,
the court reasoned that the defendant had not demonstrated “an
objectively reasonable legitimate expectation of privacy in his
subscriber information.”

79

That is, by entering into a service

agreement with his internet service provider, the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily revealed his personal information
connected to his IP address.80

As such, the defendant was not

entitled to claim a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his
subscriber identifying information.81
It is important to note that although courts have held that
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an internet user does not
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his
identifying information, a distinction exists between the Fourth
Amendment protection afforded to subscriber information versus
non-subscriber information.

Courts have emphasized the

distinction between the content of electronic communication
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which is protected and non-content information such as
subscriber identifying information, which is not protected.82
B. Internet Search Data Should Be Protected Under the Fourth
Amendment when Applying an Objective Standard of
Reasonableness
As applied, the reasonable expectation of privacy test uses
an objective standard when defining reasonableness.

In deciding

whether an individual has an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy, courts employ risk analysis.

As the court in United

States v. Hambrick stated:
The objective reasonableness prong of the privacy test is
ultimately a value judgment and a determination of how much
privacy a society should have. In making this
constitutional determination, a court must employ a sort of
risk analysis, asking whether the individual affected
should have expected the material at issue to remain
private.83
When applying this “risk analysis,” courts balance the
degree to which the search intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
with the degree in which the search is necessary to promote a
legitimate government interest.84
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As technology advances it is necessary to re-analyze the
characteristics of what satisfied this balancing approach when
determining reasonableness.

When dealing with electronic mail,

courts have stated that users have a reasonable expectation of
privacy85 and there is no reason internet search data should be
given much different treatment.
In United States v. Maxwell, the court held that email
transmissions seized by military officials were not available
for use against the defendant in court because defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the content of
his emails.86

Moreover, the court stated:

Email transmissions are not unlike other forms of modern
communication. We can draw parallels from these other
mediums. For example, if a sender of first-class mail seals
an envelope and addresses it to another person, the sender
can reasonably expect the contents to remain private and
free from the eyes of the police absent a search warrant
founded upon probable cause.87
The court focused on the notion that an email message is
stored at a fixed location and a user has a justifiable
expectation that his communication is private. This process does
not differ much from how search term data is used by third party
search engines when employed.
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For example, when an internet user decides to research a
topic she will enter the search terms into the search engine’s
toolbar. In this instance the user is communicating with the
search engine and when her data is submitted, it is stored
(however briefly) at a fixed location for further processing.
This series of steps and communications is analogous to sending
electronic email, such that the user is communicating with the
third party, using its means of information transmission, and
the user can reasonably expect the contents of his communication
to remain private absent a search warrant.
The reasonable expectation of privacy test as developed in
Katz, was further developed by the Supreme Court in a second
line of cases dealing with third parties.

Under these “third

party cases” the Court articulated the “third-party doctrine”
stating that an individual retains no reasonable expectation of
privacy when providing information to a third party.88
C. The Third Party Doctrine
Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v.
Miller, an individual retains no reasonable expectation of
privacy when revealing information to a third party, even where
that information is revealed for a limited purpose and under the

88

Stephen E. Henderson, supra note 28 at 511.
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assumption that it is only for the third party’s use.89

In

Miller, the Court found that there was no expectation of privacy
in the contents of bank records that were forcefully obtained by
government officials.90

Rather than focusing on the individual’s

subjective expectations of privacy, the Court held that bank
records were not private papers and thus were not protected
under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the documents seized
contained only information that had voluntarily been given to
the banks and thus the defendant held no reasonable expectation
of privacy.91

Lastly, the documents were given in the ordinary

course of the bank’s business and therefore were not
confidential communications.92
The Court expanded the third-party doctrine further in
Smith v. Maryland.93

In Smith, police investigators collected

information from a device installed outside the defendant’s
telephone which recorded numbers dialed by the defendant from
his telephone.94

The Supreme Court held that the installation of
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the device by the phone company at the request of the police did
not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.95

The Court reasoned that because the phone numbers

were voluntarily conveyed by the defendant to the phone company,
he held no reasonable expectation of privacy over such
information; moreover, the telephone company kept records of
such information as part of its regular business.96
Since the decisions in Miller and Smith, the principles
conveyed in the third-party doctrine have left an array of
personal records such as website transactional records,
financial records, and some emails devoid of Fourth Amendment
protection.97
Under the terms of Google’s privacy policy, a user’s
personal information is protected, including “information that
you provide to us which personally identifies you, such as your
name, email address or billing information, or other data which
can be reasonably linked to such information by Google.”98
However, as the court in Gonzales v. Google articulated,

95

Id. at 744.

96

Id.

97

Stephen E. Henderson, supra note 69 at 373.

98

Google Privacy Policy, www.google.com/privacypolicy.html (last

visited Jan. 22, 2007).
26

120
Google’s privacy policy does not proclaim to protect nonpersonal information.99

Moreover, the question remains on

whether Google’s privacy policy, in which it purports to protect
a user’s personal information, creates a reasonable expectation
of privacy for users over such information.

This would be at

odds with the third-party doctrine, where information such as a
user’s name, address, or billing information if voluntarily
given to a third party, such as is the case when using Google,
leave the user with no reasonable expectation of privacy.

The

current interpretations of the third-party doctrine should not
be applied to internet search data because internet search
histories are not similar to other forms of private information
courts have subjected to the third-party doctrine.

Courts must

observe caution when allowing government access to private
information in the name of the third-party doctrine because of
the significant potential for misuse.

As legal commentator

Daniel Solove noted, the third-party doctrine “poses one of the
most significant threats to privacy in the twenty-first
century.”100
III. The Electronic Communication Privacy Act
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In 1986 Congress passed the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (“ECPA”) in response to privacy concerns related to
evolving modern communication technologies.101

Although federal

wire tap laws provided protection over some electronic
communications, the ECPA covered a broader spectrum of
electronic communications and expanded coverage of the antiwiretapping provisions.102

Specifically, the ECPA was an

amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
which proscribed unlawful governmental access to private
electronic communications.103
Title I of the ECPA protects electronic communications
travelling over communications systems.104 Title II of the ECPA,
protects electronic messages stored on computers, and is
considered the Stored Communications Act (SCA).105

101

Title III of

Kimberly A. Horn, Privacy Versus Protection: Exploring the

Boundaries of Electronic Surveillance in the Internet Age, 29
Fordham Urb. L.J. 2233, 2248 (2002).
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the statute prohibits the use of pen register devices which are
used primarily for recording the routing, dialing, and
signalling of information when used in the process of
transmitting wire or electronic communications.106
Under the ECPA, electronic communications are defined as:
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by
a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.”107
Beyond the protection offered to electronic communications
in transit, the ECPA also provides protection for information
stored within electronic databases.108 By requiring search
warrants prior to accessing information in electronic databases
and by prohibiting most private access to stored electronic
communications, the ECPA provides much broader privacy
protection than any communications law before it.109

The ECPA

defines electronic storage as "(A) any temporary, intermediate

106
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storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the
electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for
purposes of backup protection of such communication."110
Several cases have illustrated the broad scope of the ECPA
in protecting internet user privacy when dealing with electronic
communications. In United States v. Hambrick, a series of
internet conversations implicated the defendant in an attempted
child abduction.111 The state obtained a subpoena to acquire the
defendant’s identifying information from his internet service
provider. The subpoena also asked for all other records
pertaining to the defendant’s account.112

The subpoena was later

determined to be invalid and the defendant sought to suppress
the information compiled from his internet activity.113

The

court held that for the defendant to have an interest in privacy
he must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy.114 However,
the court acknowledged that had the internet service provider
revealed the defendants information without first requiring a

110
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subpoena, that they would have been in violation of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.115 In referring to the
ECPA the court stated:
it is important to note that the court's decision does not
leave members of cybersociety without privacy protection.
Had MindSpring revealed the information at issue in this
case to the government without first requiring a subpoena,
apparently valid on its face, Mr. Hambrick could have sued
MindSpring. This is a powerful deterrent protecting privacy
in the online world and should not be taken lightly.116
Thus even where a reasonable expectations of privacy is not
found with respect to dealing with third parties, internet
companies are still required to maintain user privacy or face
civil penalties.
Perhaps just as important as the ECPA’s broad scope and
highly inclusive definitions of what constitutes electronic
communications are the limits to its protections.
A. Limitations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Although the ECPA protects a broad array of electronic
communications, the protection offered by it is in most cases
limited to communications stored for less than 180 days.117
is, the government may readily access information stored for

115
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116

Id. at 509.

117

18 U.S.C. § 2703 (a) (2007).
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greater than 180 days without much restraint.118

Under Section

2703 of the Act, the government may compel production of
electronic communications stored for over 180 days via
administrative subpoena, a warrant, a grand jury subpoena, or a
court order.119 However, only the procurement of a warrant
requires the government to establish probable cause for its
search.120

Specifically, the government need only show:

"specific and ‘articulable’ facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds' to believe the communications are relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation."121

Thus, once storage of

the electronic communications exceeds 180 days, the probable
cause requirement under the Fourth Amendment need not be met.
In addition to establishing a less stringent standard for
the retrieval of electronic communications in storage, the ECPA
also demands less when justifying the use of pen-register
devices and trap-and-trace devices.122

A pen-register device is

a device attached to telephone line which identifies and records

118 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(A)-(B) (2007).
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telephone numbers dialed in an outgoing call.123

A trap-and-

trace device also attaches to a telephone line and is used to
identify and record the telephone numbers from the origination
point of the incoming calls.124

The content captured under

either device has never been protected by the Fourth Amendment
or anti-wiretapping laws because neither device captures
communication content.125

Although the ECPA protects information

recorded by both pen-register and trap-and-trace devices where
the Fourth Amendment did not, it also does not require probable
cause be shown when government officials request court orders to
use such devices.126

All the ECPA requires is that the law

enforcement officials prove “that the information likely to be
obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being
conducted by that agency."127
Moreover, the ECPA treats electronic communications
intercepted by government officials differently than it does
voice communications.128

That is, the exclusionary rule
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preventing unlawfully intercepted communications from being used
in court does not apply to electronic communications.129
Furthermore, courts have found that even where the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act has been violated,
suppressing illegally obtained evidence is not always the
appropriate remedy.130

That is, although the ECPA allows for

civil damages and criminal punishment for violations of the
statute, it does not specifically mention anything about
suppression of evidence.131
In United States v. Kennedy, the court held that although
the defendant’s subscriber information had been divulged by his
internet service provider in violation of the ECPA, that such
information should not be suppressed in his prosecution for
possession of child pornography.132

In so holding, the court

reasoned that Congress’s clear intent when passing the ECPA was
that suppression of evidence not be an option for defendants
when their electronic communications were seized without a valid
warrant.

133

Under the court’s view, the statue was clear in
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stating “the remedies and sanctions described in this chapter
are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for
nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.”134
Although the ECPA doesn’t specifically allow for the
suppression of evidence seized in violation of its terms,
perhaps doing so would provide a greater deterrent for public
and private agencies seeking to abuse the discovery process when
seeking out electronic communications.

Moreover, even where the

intent of congress appears to favor non-suppression of evidence
when the ECPA is violated, it also seems improbable that
congress intended to allow sweeping violations of the ECPA to
occur with impunity.
B. Requiring Internet Companies to Disclose Internet-User
Search Data through Discovery Subpoenas Violates the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act
As discussed earlier, the ECPA protects individuals from
government and private intrusions upon their electronic
communications.

Controversy surrounding government subpoenas of

internet user search histories is well founded considering the
privacy issues involved.

The Gonzales v. Google case

exemplifies the potential for government intrusion upon the

134
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every day electronic communications we make when using the
internet.
C. Search Term Data is “Content” within the meaning of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act
The ECPA prohibits the government’s pretrial subpoenas for
internet user search histories.

That is, under the ECPA, search

terms created and transmitted by users for further processing by
internet search engines are covered under the ECPA as contents
of an electronic communication.135

Since “electronic

communication” means “any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data” and “contents” refers to “any information
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication,” then user search term data falls within the
protection of the ECPA.136

When a user transmits search term

data through an internet search engine such as Google, the user
is transmitting a “writing” with “substance of that
communication.”

The search engine then processes the data

received by the user and returns a list of hits.
A Massachusetts district court has already held that the
certain data beyond just email communications are considered
content protected under the Electronic Communications Privacy
135

U.S.C. § 2510 (12) (2007).

136
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Act.137

In In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use

of Pen Register & Trap, the approval of a government application
for the installation of pen-register devices on four internet
accounts was limited and the court ordered the internet service
provider (America Online) be given a listing of what it may not
disclose through the device to keep from violating its user’s
privacy.138

With regards to search term data, the court stated:

A user may visit the Google site. Presumably the pen
register would capture the IP address for that site.
However, if the user then enters a search phrase, that
search phrase would appear in the URL after the first
forward slash. This would reveal content -- that is, it
would reveal, in the words of the statute, ‘. . .
information concerning the substance, purport or meaning of
that communication.’ Title18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). The
‘substance’ and ‘meaning’ of the communication is that the
user is conducting a search for information on a particular
topic.139
Therefore, the search terms we submit to internet search
engines such as Google, Yahoo, and America Online for processing
are contents of electronic communications protected under the
ECPA.
Although there are many limitations to the protection the
ECPA provides towards electronic communications and courts have
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readily held that suppression of evidence is not a remedy when
the statute is violated, the ECPA still supports the view that
search term data are forms of private communication protected
under federal law.

If the ECPA does not protect search data and

histories from unwarranted governmental intrusion, then the
added protection it was intended to provide becomes virtually
useless.

When reviewing the definitions of what constitutes

“electronic communications” and “content” under the ECPA, it is
clear that search data falls under its guise. If and when the
time comes where the issue requires judiciary direction, courts
should give search data its necessary protection.

IV.

Permitting government subpoenas of Search term data could
lead to further intrusions of privacy given the scope and
magnitude of evolving technologies

The dangers of leaving internet search data unprotected in
the face of government inquiries are great considering the
magnitude and wide spread data collection capabilities of
evolving technologies.

Information movement has increased

between private sector entities as well as from the private to
public sector.140

Moreover, the government has incentivized the

creation of newer and more efficient data gathering programs by
140

Daniel J Solove, supra note 67 at 1095.
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offering lucrative government contracts for their creation.141
For example, over thirty federal agencies have contracted with
ChoicePoint, Inc. to obtain personal information from
ChoicePoint’s database of over ten billion records.142

The

information is collected from public records, credit reporting
agencies, private detectives.

Information from the database has

been divulged to agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service
and the Federal Bureau of Investigations.143

In addition to the

plethora of investigation technologies already available, the
federal government has also created a “wish list” of new
surveillance and tracking technologies, where companies that
create such technologies are awarded government contracts.144
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, public
officials have faced much less scrutiny when seeking to obtain
private information.145

However, the increased willingness of

private companies to cooperate with governmental inquiries into
our private communications is creating an environment for
privacy abuse. As Solove contends, the abuse of the third-party
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doctrine when applied to internet communications can lead to
three distinct problems: (1) a rise of the totalitarian state;
(2) the chilling of democratic activities; and (3) an increase
in the hazards of bureaucracy.146
With respect to a rise in a totalitarian government, Solove
contends that historically totalitarian governments have
developed intricate means of gathering information about their
citizens.147

Where the potential exists to increase means for

gathering information, there also exists the potential for a
rise in totalitarian characteristics of social control.148
Moreover, a decrease in consumer confidence and lack of
privacy can strain the democratic process and hinder individual
self determination.149

Where privacy is inadequately protected,

individuals will feel constrained in their choices and
disincentivized from participating in the democratic process.

150

Finally, where government information gathering is left
unregulated and where search term data is considered free from
Fourth Amendment protection, we face a risk of increased
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governmental bureaucracy.151

As Solove notes, the harms

associated with such an environment are: “decisions without
adequate accountability, dangerous pockets of unfettered
discretion, and choices based on short-term goals without
consideration of the long-term consequences or the larger social
effects.” 152
The framers of the Constitution sought to ensure a society
where the power of the people stands paramount.

By leaving

search data free from Fourth Amendment protection and by denying
internet users a reasonable expectation of privacy, we inch
closer to the rise of a totalitarian state.

Where government

excesses create threats of misuse and misappropriation of our
most private communications, we are left to the grim decision of
either submitting to a lack of privacy or choosing not to
participate in evolving technology. The increase in
communications capabilities and internet databases augments that
risk and makes the regulation of internet search data crucial
for continued growth.
V.

Conclusion
By requiring internet service providers to provide

information pertaining to their subscribers’ activity when
151
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surfing the net, the government is violating the Fourth
Amendment because users have a reasonable expectation of privacy
when using the internet for purposes of searching for
information.

Although courts have consistently held that no

Fourth Amendment protection exists for internet subscriber
identifying information because there is no objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy, such information should be
distinguished from other forms of electronic data such as search
histories and records.
User search data is more analogous to email communications—
which do benefit from Fourth Amendment protection—than to
subscriber information.

Therefore the third-party doctrine

should not apply internet data beyond basic identifying
information because outside that spectrum users do have an
objectively reasonably expectation of privacy when surfing the
net.
Moreover, requiring internet service providers to provide
user search histories without a proper subpoena violates the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act because such information
is protected as “content” as defined by the act and not within
any exception found therein.

The court in Gonzales v. Google

did not rule on the privacy issues implicated by the
government’s subpoena for Google’s search records and courts in
general have yet to rule on any privacy issue relating to
42

120
internet user activity beyond email communications and
subscriber identifying information.

The continued growth of

internet search engines such as Google and the increasing
utility of such networks in our society make protecting the
privacy of users employing such systems of paramount importance.
To avoid the pitfalls of unregulated intrusions upon our private
electronic communications and to maintain the confidence of
consumers who rely on such communications, courts will have to
hold government accountable whenever it chooses to stretch the
limitations of our Fourth Amendment protection.
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